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Abstract  
Little is known about the living conditions of a growing number of elderly persons in India partly 
reflecting the common belief that they are well-cared for by their children with whom they tend to 
coreside. Analysis of  living arrangements using  the recent National Sample Survey data from 
rural India suggests that although presence of economically active sons with schooling may 
enhance the likelihood of coresidence, there are limits to children as old age security. Current 
health and wealth of the elderly play a key role in our sample: vulnerable elderly persons who 
lack health, wealth or both are less likely to coreside. In the absence of any tradition of extra-
familial  welfare systems, the welfare state therefore needs to intervene to protect the interests of 
the disadvantaged elderly.  
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Do Children Act As Old Age Security in Rural India?  




Population is ageing in most countries today though the implications of ageing are more serious 
for developing countries like India where there are problems of earning from assets in old age, 
where credit and insurance markets are poorly developed and where there is no tradition of extra 
familial welfare institutions.
1 Traditionally the burden of caring for the elderly is borne by the 
immediate family in India. However with a growing trend towards nuclear family set up and the 
associated decay of the extended family structure, the vulnerability of the ageing population is 
increasing. Unless policies and social protection schemes specifically address issues of the old 
age poverty,
2 targets for poverty reduction will not be achieved.  
              Little is however known about the living conditions of the elderly in India. The latter in 
part reflects the common belief that they are well provided  for by their sons with whom they 
predominantly  tend to coreside. Using 1995-96 National Sample Survey data, the present paper 
examines the pattern of living arrangements among male and female elderly members and derives 
implications for children as old age security in rural India.  
            Old age security hypothesis centres on the argument that children provide some 
form of insurance against risks when parents are old, which in turn, justifies parental investment 
in young children. Although investment in children may be risky (because they may die, be born 
with the wrong sex, be economic failures or disloyal), children still have the qualities that set 
                                                  
1 Majority of the older people in India work outside the formal sector and lack the capacity to save. Only 1 in 10 Indian 
workers participates in some pension schemes (World Bank, 1994). 
 
2 There are no official data on the income of the elderly in India.   2 
them apart from other possible sources of old age insurance in developing countries, e.g., land or 
other assets. The existing empirical literature is, however, very limited and often focuses on 
fertility motive for old age security. For example, population and development theorists (e.g., 
Cain, 1983; Nugent 1985) rationalise fertility in terms of old age security hypothesis. These 
studies highlight the values of children as insurance against the risk of income insufficiency in 
parents’ old age. Raut (1996) shows that parents have longer birth spacing when they have a 
sufficient stock of wealth to support themselves during the old age. He also shows that the 
probability that respondents will rely on their children when they are old is lower for couples with 
high income, with better access to private pensions
3 and other financial assets. Vlassoff and 
Vlassoff (1980) challenged the validity of the fertility motive for old age security and suggested 
that economic resources and not the number of sons are relevant factors determining old age 
security in rural Maharashtra. Vlassoff (1990) further argued that sons are  valuable in rural 
Maharashtra (western India) more for the cultural reasons than for economic support and care.  
There are also studies examining the nature of intergenerational transfer of resources 
from adult children to elderly parents in developing countries. Kochar ( 2000), for example, 
argued that intra-household transfers are likely to be dominated by income transfers between 
parents and co-resident children and there is a negative correlation between days work reported 
by fathers and the incomes earned by their co-resident adult sons in rural Pakistan. Lillard and 
Willis (1997) assess the alternative motives for intergenerational transfer for elderly parents in 
Malaysia and find evidence in favour of old age security and also that old age security is, in part, 
children’s repayments to parental investment in their education.  
                                                  
3 The idea that social security may act as a substitute for children is empirically supported (e.g., Nugent and Gillaspy, 
1983). In a similar vein it is suggested that children and financial markets are competing assets for support in old age 
(Cigno, 1993). The demand for children for old age has also been linked to the uncertainty related to expected transfer 
from children (Rosati, 1996; Jellal and Wolff, 2002).   
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Indirect evidence of old age security may also be found from the studies on the pattern of 
living arrangements among the elderly persons in different developing countries.
4 For example, 
Devanzo and Chan (1994) find that higher parental income is associated with lower co-residency 
in Malaysia. Cameron (2000) however argues the opposite that co-residency is a desirable state 
for elderly Indonesians despite their income levels while higher income of children is likely to 
lower co-residency perhaps against the parental wish.  
Clearly, these existing  studies tend to emphasize the role of financial support from adult 
children to elderly parents. In doing so, these studies not only  ignores the importance of other 
non-financial assistance provided by children, e.g., health
5 and other personal care (e.g., help with 
daily  household chores cooking, cleaning, especially for the frail and sick ones), in old age, but 
also the reverse flow of services (financial and others) from elderly parents to their adult children 
well into their old age. An exception is Hoddinott (1992), who considered both financial and 
other types of assistance, provided by children and argued that elderly parents in western Kenya 
can induce greater assistance with household tasks and also monetary transfers if they have more 
inheritable assets. In analysing the pattern of living arrangements among the elderly in rural India, 
the present paper extends this line of argument and, among other things, focuses on the effects of 
parental contributions (vis-à-vis those offered by adult children) on the likelihood of coresidence 
with children. We thus argue that coresidence with children is a mutually beneficial arrangement 
in rural India. On the one hand, children may provide financial and other personal assistance to 
their elderly parents. On the other hand, the elderly persons too continue to contribute to the 
family both financially and otherwise well into their  old age.  In particular, we compare the 
welfare implications of different living arrangements and then identify the factors determining the 
                                                  
4 This excludes the sizeable literature investigating the determinants of living arrangements of the elderly in various 
western countries (e.g., Schwartz, Danziger and Smolensky, 1984; Borsch-Supan, 1989, Kotlikoff and Morris, 1987, 
1990; Borsch-Supan , 1990; Borsch-Supan et al , 1992.  This is because in most western countries there is social 
security for the elderly. 
5 Kochar (1999) argues that medical expenditures on the elderly in rural Pakistan declines with elderly’s 
declining economic contributions which is closely related to a sharp decline in wages rates with age.    4 
likelihood of coresidence with a view to derive indirect implications for children as old age 
security.  
The empirical analysis is based on the 52
nd round National Sample Survey (NSS) data 
from the rural sectors of the Indian states. This is a special round of  the NSS that collects 
additional information on the elderly members of sample households living in different states of 
India. We choose to focus on the rural households because of the greater poverty and 
vulnerability of the elderly people residing in the rural sector. Unlike their urban counterparts, 
many rural elderly do not own financial assets and/or property. A majority of rural Indians tend to 
work in the informal sector and lacks the provision of regular income after retirement. In the 
absence of any  extra-familial welfare institutions (private or state provided), dependence on 
children for financial assistance and/or personal care may be crucial for those who lack health, 
wealth or both. In this context, we focus on the following aspsects: (a) effects of the presence of 
economically active sons with schooling (progeny effects) on coresidence with children. Presence 
of able sons in the family could relfect both financial and other personal care generally offered to 
the elderly parents and could thus be regarded as a test for old age insurance. (b) The argument 
for children as old age insurance could however be weakened if there is evidence that health and 
wealth of the elderly too play an important role in determining coresidence with children. Hence, 
we also  consider  the role  of reverse flow of services from the elderly parents to their adult 
children. To this end, we examine the effects of elderly person’s accumulated wealth (wealth 
effects) and current health status (health effects)
6 on coresidence with children.   
Since our analysis focuses on the  current living arrangements of the elderly members of 
households using cross-section household-level data for 1995-96, without any loss of generality 
we assume that education, marital status and past employment of the elderly to be given and thus 
                                                  
6 The latter would also reflect an elderly person’s ability to participate in daily household chores/social/religious mattes 
and/or their current economic participation, if any.  
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directly focus on the hypotheses of our interest.  There  still  remain serious problems of 
simultaneity between  presence of economically active sons with schooling, current wealth 
(current property and/or financial assets)  and health of the elderly, on the one  hand and 
coresidency with children on the other. In an attempt to address these problems of simultaneity, 
we use a unique correlated model to jointly determine presence of economically active sons with 
schooling, current health, wealth and co-residence with children (with/without the spouse).  
                The paper is developed as follows. Section 2 describes the data and section 3 explains 
the methodology of our empirical analysis. S ection  4 analyses the results and the final section 
concludes.   
 
2. DATA  
We use the fifty-second round NSS data from the rural sector of different states and  union 
territories in India collected in 1995-96. This particular round of NSS data provides additional 
information on the elderly members of the sample households, aged sixty years and above. In 
particular, we observe  living arrangements, state of economic dependence, 
ownership/management of financial assets and/or properties, actual health problems of the elderly 
as well as their participation in daily household chores, social/religious matters. For example, we 
observe if an elderly person is living alone or in an old home, co-residing with spouse only, 
spouse and own children or own children only (without the spouse). Second, we have information 
on the state of economic dependence of these elderly members, i.e., if they are economically 
independent or dependent (fully/partially) and if dependent, who is supporting the elderly 
member (e.g., spouse, children, grand children or others). In case the elderly person is financially 
independent, we also observe the number of dependants that s/he has to provide for. The survey 
also provides information on ownership/management of properties/financial assets of the elderly 
person. Among various health problems, we observe the state of physical immobility (if confined 
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to bed or home), disability (visual, hearing, speech, locomotor etc.) and/or chronic (long-term, 
e.g., high blood pressure, heart problems, cough, stomach related problems etc.) illness if any.
7 In 
addition, we observe whether these elderly members are able to participate in daily household 
chores or other social/religious matters.  Finally,  we have information pertaining to the usual 
individual, household and other community characteristics of all members of the sample 
households that most household survey data provides. 
 
2.1. Aspects of living arrangements in rural India 
As a result of the success of the Indian family planning programme and significant improvement 
in life expectancy, there has been a slow but steady increase in the proportion of older people in 
total population. While in 1961 5.6% (12.36 million) of the total population were old (aged sixty 
years or above), in 1996 about 7% (62.32 million) of the total population were aged.  Though 
there are no official estimates of the poverty among the aged population, there are millions of 
elderly persons below the official poverty line (Gore, 1992).  
  The data-set includes elderly members aged sixty or above of different marital 
status living in the rural sector of different states in India. We have excluded the never married 
elderly members from our analysis as none of them had any children in our sample. The sample 
of elderly members consists of household head, his/her spouse, parents or parents-in-law and 
other relations or non-relations of the head of the household. We however choose to consider the 
head and his/her spouse aged sixty or above as we can identify the characteristics of their children 
(that feature prominently in our analysis of old age security), which is not possible for other 
                                                  
7 Besides incidence of illness, health has many other dimensions as may be captured, e.g., by nutritional intake or 
anthropometric measures (heights, weights etc.) that we cannot incorporate in this study for dearth of information in 
our data-set. But the main contribution of the present study is to analyse some different aspects of adult health status 
that is not strictly based on nutrition and other anthropometric measure and has not been studied before. Also, this 
paper attempts to capture the aspects of health externality, i.e., how health of an old head is affected by 
characteristics/behaviour of his/her spouse, children and grand children in the family.     
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elderly members. This gives rise to a sample size of 13810 elderly members of whom 3555 
(about a quarter of the sample) had no children.
8    
  Information on co-residence with children is obtained from the pattern of living 
arrangements. We can identify if someone is living with spouse and children or with children 
only (without the spouse). The latter is closely related to the marital status of the elderly persons:  
while a majority of currently married elderly members with children co-reside with spouse and 
children, a majority of widowed/separated elderly members wi th children co-reside with children 
only. However, a majority of currently married elderly members without  children co-reside with 
spouse only. Other types of living arrangements are also observed, e.g., whether someone is 
living on his/her own, or in an old home or living with other relations or even non-relations, 
though the proportions of cases are not that significant in our sample.   
  First we consider the pattern of living arrangements among all elderly men and 
women (with and without children) in our sample. While 75% of widowed male (as against 57% 
of widowed female) live with their children, 28% of widowed female (as against only 8% of 
widowed male) live on their own. Thus a smaller proportion of widowed/separated women live 
with their children. Secondly, a majority of married male (81%) and female (77%) elderly 
members live with their spouse and children while only 15% of married male and 18% of married 
female live with their spouse only (without children). Selected characteristics of all elderly 
members with different types of living arrangements are summarised in Table 1A.
9  
  If, however, we distinguish between elderly persons with/without children, a 
clearer pattern is found. In general about 98% of both married and widowed  elderly members 
                                                  
8 Compared to the non-household head elderly members (34% of the full sample most of whom are the 
parents/parents-in-law and the rest are other types of relatives), this may be a sample of better-off elderly. 
We needed to focus on this group of elderly heads and their spouses as we needed information on all their 
children. We however intend to study the case of non-household head elderly in a separate paper. 
9 All figures are adjusted by sample weights.   8 
with children  tend to coreside with children  (with or without the spouse).
10 In contrast, 
considering the elderly members  without children, about 95% of currently married men and 
women live with spouse only; 68% widowed women and 47% widowed men live on their own or 
in an old home while others tend to live with other relations or non-relations. Thus in the absence 
of any extra familial traditions of old age security, elderly men and women without children are 
more vulnerable than those with children and co-residing with children (with or without spouse). 
  Most existing literature tends to highlight the importance of financial dependence 
on children among elderly parents. Financial dependence on children
11 however depends on 
gender and marital status of elderly members of households. For example, while 71% of widowed 
women with children are financially dependent on children, only 45% of married women are 
financially dependent on children. In contrast, incidence of financial dependence on children is 
significantly less  among elderly men: Only 36% of currently married men and 48% of 
widowed/separated men are financially dependent on children. 
  In this context, it is also important to examine the distribution of educated and 
economically active sons among the sample elderly. In general, 55% of sample elderly with 
children has economically active married sons while only 22% has economically active 
unmarried sons with schooling. If however we  cross-tabulate the incidence of financial 
dependence on children and presence of economically active educated sons, we find that as high 
as 72% of financially  dependent elderly has at least one economically active educated son 
(married and/or unmarried). Thus, other things remaining the same, there seems to be a close 
correspondence between presence of economically active sons with schooling and elderly parents 
financial dependence on children. 
                                                  
10  We note that more than 90% of these elderly members have at least one son coresiding with them. So it 
is highly likely that most of them tend to coreside with sons.   
11 We cannot however identify if married/unmarried sons or daughters are providing this financial 
assistance. But we can assume without much loss of generality that most elderly persons financially 
dependent on children tend to receive the assistance from their adult economically active sons.   9 
  Financial dependence on children is also correlated to the elderly person’s current 
savings defined as the ownership of property and/or financial  assets. Among the elderly with 
children 78% have some financial assets and/or property, which are essentially their lifetime 
savings. Among those with some form of savings, 63% are financially independent while others 
are dependent on children.  There  is a lso  some pronounced gender difference in financial 
dependence on children in old age. An  obvious reason for higher financial dependence of 
married/widowed female members is their lack of ownership of property and/or financial assets. 
In particular, while 51% of married and 49% of widowed women owned financial assets, 75% 
married and 72% widowed men owned financial assets. Similarly, while only 55% married and 
67% widowed women owned properties, 88% married and 82% widowed men did so.
12 Secondly, 
we consider if some elderly person has made provision for regular income in old age (usually 
provided by participation in some pension scheme during their working life). The latter is closely 
related to the occupational choice during the major part of the working life. Only about 3% of our 
sample elderly members had access to some regular income and as high as 80% of them were 
men. Finally, we also find that a significantly higher proportion of men continue to earn through 
participation in self-employment or various informal casual farm/non-farm jobs well into their old 
age. In particular, as high as 70% of married and 58% of widowed men (with children) are 
currently economically active. These figures are only 20% and 27% for married and widowed 
women respectively. Taken together, elderly women, especially widowed/separated ones are 
particularly vulnerable as they do not have many options but to depend on adult children, 
especially sons. 
  Another possible factor influencing the coresidence with children is the current 
health status and personal care, if any, offered to sick and frail elderly parents by co-resident 
                                                  
12 We cannot however identify if married/unmarried sons or daughters are providing this financial 
assistance. But we can assume without much loss of generality that most elderly persons financially 
dependent on children tend to receive the assistance from their adult economically active sons.  
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children (in fact there could be a two way relationship between health status and living 
arrangements), which has not so far been highlighted  in the literature on low-income countries. In 
the absence of any information  on direct health care provided by co-resident children, we 
consider three different indicators of actual health problems among the elderly members to obtain 
indirect evidence of health care assistance provided by co-resident children.  These h ealth 
problems relate to (a) physical disability (visual, speech, hearing, locomotor), (b) chronic illness 
(cough, problem of joint, heart problem, high/low blood pressure, urinary problems, diabetes, 
cancer) and (c) physical immobility (i.e., confined to bed or confined to home) among the elderly. 
Compared to elderly women in our sample, incidence of these health problems are found to be 
slightly higher among elderly men. For example 33% married men (as against  29% married 
women) have some physical disability; 51% married men (as opposed to 46% married women) 
suffered from some chronic illness; 8% married men (as against 7% of married women) had some 
kind of physical immobility. Also compared to married elderly m embers, incidence of these 
health problems is higher among widowed/separated members of a given gender: 43% widowed 
men (41% widowed women) have physical disability, 56% widowed men (55% widowed 
women) suffer from chronic illness and 10% widowed men (7% widowed women) have some 
physical immobility.  Taken together, we find that about 63% elderly men and 60% elderly 
women suffer from one or more of these health problems. Compared to widowed/separated 
elderly persons, incidence of these health problems is generally lower among married men (62%) 
and women (57%). However, compared to widowed/separated elderly men, incidence of health 
problems is higher among widowed/separated women (71% as against 69%).  
  Though the old age security hypothesis emphasizes the role of financial transfer 
from adult children to elderly parents, a significant proportion of elderly persons in our sample   11 
continue to contribute to their family, financially or otherwise.
13 For example, a significant 
proportion of elderly persons, especially elderly men,  continue to supplement family earnings. 
About 43% of elderly men with children provide financial support to their family and about 90% 
of them are currently economically active. As expected, the corresponding proportion for elderly 
women supporting their family is much less: only about 10% elderly women co-residing with 
children provide financial support to their families and 56% of them are currently economically 
active. Elderly persons are also found to contribute to the family by participating in daily 
household chores, social/religious matters. Nearly 80% of elderly members in our sample tend to 
participate in these activities irrespective of their gender and marital status. However, compared 
to men, a slightly higher proportion of women  participate in daily household chores while a 
higher proportion of men tend to participate in social or religious matters. 
  
2.2. Living Arrangements and Standard of Living 
Before we examine the pattern of living arrangements among the elderly, it is pertinent to 
compare the welfare levels associated with different kinds of living arrangements in our sample. 
In doing so, we classify sample elderly members into three categories: (a) those living with 
children (with or without spouse), (b) those living with spouse only and (c) those living alone, in 
old home or with  other non-relations. Table 1B summarises the characteristics of these elderly 
members pertaining to wealth, health as well as their participation in daily household chores and 
other social and religious matters. Our primary observations are summarised here. (i) A higher 
proportion of elderly persons living with children tend to own properties and financial assets 
while a lower proportion of them have made provision of regular income. (ii) A higher proportion 
of elderly members living with children participate in social and religious matters, but a slightly 
lower proportion of them participate in daily household chores. (iii) A lower proportion of these 
                                                  
13 One may argue that their contribution declines with age since in general wage rates decline wth age. But 
the total economic contribution of an elderly also includes ownership of their accumulated wealth   12 
elderly members living with their children suffer  from chronic illness, physical disability or 
immobility. (iv) Only about a third of the elderly living on their own have children or other 
relatives living in the same village/town.    
  Table 1C compares the average per capita monthly consumer expenditure (APCE) 
for elderly persons in different living arrangements. There are two important issues involved in 
the comparison of APCE. First of all, use of APCE to compare different groups of households is  
problematic since it ignores differences in household age-sex composition (e.g., % of adult/child, 
male/female etc.). One way of addressing this difficulty is to make use of the equivalence scales 
that allows us to give different weights to household members with different age/sex composition. 
We examine the sensitivity of the scale adjusted APCE to different choice of weights given to 
adult (>15 years) male,  adult  female and children (0-15 years old) respectively : (1,1,0.6), 
(1,0.8,0.6), (1,0.7,0.5). 
  Secondly, one needs to take account of the possibility of size economies of consumption. 
The scale adjusted per capita expenditure y for a household of size n is defined as: 
n
Y
y q =  
where Y is the total household expenditure, n family size and  q is a parameter lying between 0 
and 1. If  q = 1, there are no economies of scale (y is the per capita expenditure) and if q=0, y is 
the total household expenditure (e.g., the case of public goods where one person’s consumption 
does not lower the consumption of others in the household). In contrast, a lower value of q would 
signify a larger economies of scale in consumption. We have considered 4 possible intermediate 
values of  q, namely, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, & 0.2 to compare adjusted APCE among different living 
arrangements .   
  Both unadjusted and adjusted APCE are shown in Table 1C. While the unadjusted APCE 
does not seem to vary much between alternative living arrangements, equivalence scale adjusted 
                                                                                                                                                    
(ownership of property and/or financial assets), if any.   13 
APCE figures are significantly higher for elderly persons living with children irrespective of the 
choice of weights. The same holds for different choices of  q, even when there are smaller 
economies of scale.
14 Thus living arrangements and APCE as a measure of living standards seem 
to be correlated in our sample such that adjusted APCE figures are higher for elderly members 
coresiding with children than otherwise.  Although some may argue that APCE to be a poor 
indicator of household welfare, in the absence of any better indicator, the evidence from this 
simple exercise would  indicate that in the absence of any extra-familial welfare institutions,   
coresidence with children is associated with higher standard of living  in our sample.  
  In the next section we move on to an analysis of coresidence with children and examine if 
elderly persons’ coresidence with adult children is a sufficient means of old age insurance for all 
groups of elderly in rural India.  
 
 
3. AN ANALYSIS OF CORESIDENCE WITH CHILDREN  
Choice of a living arrangement, as an independent household, with adult children or other related 
or unrelated persons has i mportant external effects for the well-being of an elderly person. 
Traditionally joint residence of adult children with their elderly parents  is viewed as an 
arrangement where elderly parents receive financial and other assistance from coresident adult 
children. However, analysis of our data in section 2.1 provides indirect evidence that elderly 
persons, especially elderly men, continue to  offer financial support to the family well into their 
old age through accumulated wealth and/or active economic participation. Depending on their 
current health status, a majority of elderly persons are also found to contribute to the family in 
other ways, e.g., by participating in daily household chores, social/religious matters. Thus without 
much loss of generality, we can argue that elderly persons’ co-residence with children (and thus 
                                                  
14 Table 2A and Table 2B further support this inference for the complete sample in that the adjusted APCE 
figures are always higher among households with older members and this holds good in all the states.    14 
children’s co-residence with elderly parents) is a mutually advantageous arrangement in rural 
India.   
  Although we attempt to highlight the two-way flow of services between elderly 
parents and co-resident adult children, we are constrained by the availability of some relevant 
information. For example, NSS provides information only on whether an elderly member is 
financially dependent on their own children though we cannot identify whether elderly parents 
receive financial support from  co-resident or non-coresident children. We cannot also identify if 
assistance is provided by a son/daughter - married/unmarried. The data-set also does not provide 
any further information regarding the types of non-financial assistance children may provide to 
their elderly parents. Thus, motives are not always directly observable and hence one needs to 
identify indirectly the a priori circumstances that may influence the intensity of the motive for co-
residence.   
  We consider a static one period framework for analysing coresidence with children and  
posited here, without much loss of generality, that  current coresidence with children is closely 
related to current wealth (wealth effects) and health (health effects) of the elderly as well as the 
presence of economically active sons with schooling (progeny effects). While the favourable 
effects of the presence of educated and economically active sons would on coresidence would 
strengthen the value of children as old age insurance, significant influence of current health and 
wealth would suggest the importance of alternative means for old age insurance. Let us now 
explain our central hypotheses with respect health, wealth and progeny effects of coresidence.  
Wealth effects: Ownership of financial assets and properties are savings or accumulated 
wealth over the life cycle and can be expected to vary with living arrangements. This is because 
besides children savings represent an alternative form of old age insurance. For example, the 
availability of savings can be expected to reflect the individual’s (unobserved) life cycle income 
profile which would also influence living arrangements.  Savings or accumulated wealth may 
affect living arrangements in different ways. Wealthy elderly parents may influence the action of   15 
their children ex ante with their resources (Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985) or conversely 
parental resources may attract kids to coreside with them. Moreover, both own savings and living 
arrangements are likely to reflect the unobserved wealth of other members of the household.  
In our analysis wealth is measured by a composite indicator called PROPFA. The 
variable takes a value 1 if the elderly person currently owns any property and/or financial assets 
and zero otherwise.  
Health effects: Current health status of the elderly too may affect living arrangements.
15 
For example, in the absence of any  alternative welfare system, an elderly person with health 
problems may receive personal health care from coresident adult children especially when they 
are sick and frail.  There is  also  the possibility that elderly with health problems may be 
discouraged from coresidence and may be forced to live on their own (with/without the spouse). 
Here w e examine the effect of elderly person’s  health status (good health or lack of it)  on 
coresidence, thus yielding some indirect evidence of health effects.  
  Though we do not observe the personal care, if any, provided by the coresident 
children, we derive a composite health indicator (HLTHPROB) from three indicators of actual 
health problems: (i) chronic illness (e.g., heart problem, blood pressure, diabetes etc.); (ii) 
physical disability (e.g., hearing, vision, speech etc.) and (iii) physical immobility (confined to 
bed or home). The variable HLTHPROB is one if the elderly person suffers from any of these 
health problems and zero otherwise.
16 Significance of this composite indicator HLTHPROB in 
determining coresidence with children could, in the absence of any better indicator, be taken as a 
measure of personal care offered by coresident children to elderly sick parents. It is also worth 
emphasizing here that the indicators of health used in our analysis are measures of actual health 
                                                  
15 It would also be correlated with the elderly person’s ability to participate in daily household chores, 
social and/or religious matters – so we refrain from including the latter in our econometric analysis and 
keep the present framework more tractable. 
16 This is however a one-dimenstional variable reflecting current health status of the elderly and cannot 
capture the intensity of health problems, e.g., one suffering from more than one health problems identified 
here would be worse off than one suffering from any one of these problems.   16 
problems, rather than the instrumental activities of daily living.  Hence, we do not need to treat 
health as a latent immeasurable variable.  
  Progeny effects: Coresidence with daughters is not socially very desirable in India 
except in very special circumstances, e.g., if the daughter is a widow or if the elderly person does 
not have any son (see Vlassoff, 1990 for example). Traditionally sons are expected to provide 
financial assistance to elderly parents. Thus sons in India, are a main source of old age security, 
which it is argued, provides a rationale for greater investment in sons’ schooling (relative to girls) 
when children are young.  Coresident sons and their family could also offer medical and/or 
personal care to the elderly parents. So a primary variable of our interest is whether an elderly 
person has any economically active married and/or unmarried sons with schooling. If presence of 
adult economically active sons with schooling (SONSCHEA) encourages coresidence, this could 
provide indirect evidence of the flow of services (financial and others) from these children to 
their elderly parents as repayment for the parental investment in child education when these 




3.1. Modelling coresidency  
 
The primary variable of our interest is coresidence with children:  
     CORESIDE = 1 if an elderly lives with children (with/without spouse)  
    = 0 otherwise 
It is assumed here that  u X CORESIDE c c c + + = h b  where X c   is a set of  observable 
individual/household characteristics explaining coresidence.  
  Specification of X C : C o-residence with children depends not only on gender 
(MALE), marital status (WIDSEP), schooling (SCH)  of the elderly person, but also on the   17 
presence of economically active married/unmarried  sons with schooling
17 (SONSCH), measures 
of wealth, e.g., ownership of property
18 and/or financial assets (PROPFA), if any,
19 as well as the 
current health status (HLTHPROB) of the elderly.
20  
  In addition to the observable characteristics,  it is likely that  household-level 
unobserved heterogeneity  may be significant in  explaining coresidence with children in  our 
sample. For example, we do not observe the life cycle income or consumption profile of the 
elderly person or wealth of other members of the household though these could affect the living 
arrangements  significantly.  This unobserved  heterogeneity  is accounted for by  hc where 
( )
2 ~0, cc N hs  is assumed to be uncorrelated with other covariates. All other residual variation 
is captured by  uC :  ) 1 , 0 ( ~ IIDN uC .   
 
    3.2. Addressing the problems of simultaneity 
Addressing simultaneity is a difficult problem in our analysis where household structure affects 
elderly person’s well-being measured in terms of their coresidence with their children, which are 
all choice variables. The problem could be somewhat simplified if we could consider a static one-
period framework. Thus, without much loss of generality, we could assume gender, marital status, 
education and past employment of the elderly person to be given. Consequently, we need to 
address the simultaneity between elderly person’s coresidence with children (CORESIDE) on the 
one hand, and their current wealth (PROPFA),  health (HLTHPROB)  and  presence of 
economically active sons (SONSCHEA) on the other. Ignoring this simultaneity is likely to bias 
our estimates. To redress this problem, we determine CORESIDE with PROPFA, HLTHPROB 
                                                  
17 In our cross-section analysis of living arrangements of the elderly, we assume the family composition to be given and 
thus abstract from the dynamics of fertility and old age security, which is beyond the scope of this paper. 
18 While we do not specifically know if the family house is owned by the elderly person, elderly person’s ownership of 
property is taken to be a measure of the ownership of family house.  
19 In our sample there is a significant correlation between ownership of property and/or financial assets of the 
elderly and  their financial dependence on own children. So we leave out elderly person’s financial dependence on 
children from our econometric analysis.   18 
and SONSCHEA as correlated processes.
  
  In our specification, the first problem of simultaneity may arise with respect to 
elderly person’s current wealth as measured by  ownership of  financial assets and/or properties 
(PROPFA ). As argued earlier, ownership of wealth could co-vary with living arrangements if the 
former represent an alternative form of old-age insurance. In an attempt to address this problem, 
we estimate the following equation:  
u x PROPFA W W W W + + = h b  
Where X W refers to a vector of explanatory variables affecting wealth, hW captures unobserved 
heterogeneity and u F captures any other residual variation where  ) , 0 ( ~ 2 s h W W N  and is 
uncorrelated with all other covariates and  ) 1 , 0 ( IIDN uW = .  
   The second possible simultaneity in a static one-period framework arises with 
respect to the inclusion of current health problems into the coresidency function. On the one 
hand, given the health problems elderly persons may decide to coreside with children. On the 
other hand there is some literature suggesting that choice of residential location may affect health 
(e.g., Borsch Supan et al., 1996). Given this possibility of simultaneity between co-residence and 
health problems, we estimate the following equation:  u X HLTHPROB H H H H + + = h b  
where X H refers to a vector of explanatory variables that affect health of the elderly, hH 
captures unobserved heterogeneity and u H captures any other residual variation such that 
) , 0 ( ~ 2 s h H H N  and is uncorrelated with all other covariates and  ) 1 , 0 ( IIDN uH = .  
  Finally, one could also identify a possible simultaneity between  coresidence with 
children and presence of economically active sons with schooling (SONSCHEA). So the progeny   
 
                                                                                                                                                    
20 Though we also observe an elderly person’s participation in daily household chores, social/religious matters, we 
could not include these variables in explaining coresidence as this could raise further questions about simultaneity.    19 
equation that we estimate here is as follows:  u X SONSCHEA S S S S + + = h b  where X S refers 
to a vector of explanatory variables that affect financial dependence on children,  hN captures 
unobserved heterogeneity and u S captures any other residual variation:  ) , 0 ( ~ 2 s h S S N  and is 
uncorrelated with all other covariates and  ) 1 , 0 ( IIDN uS = .  
  Clearly all four variables, namely, CORESIDE, PROPFA, HLTHPROB and 
SONSCHEA are b inary variables. We use univariate probit specifications to model them. The 
likelihood functions in these cases would be as follows:  
Coresidence : 
otherwise u X






+ + F - =




Wealth:      
otherwise u X
wealth owns elderly the if u X L
W W W




+ + F - =




Health:       
otherwise u X
problems health has elderly the if u X L
H H H




+ + F - =




Progeny:   
otherwise u X
schooling with sons active has if u X L
S S S




+ + F - =




  In order to build  up  a coherent model  (see Maddala, 1982 pp. 117-125), we 
develop a recursive system  such  that the summed  probability over all  possible outcome 
combinations is equal to one.  Thus we do not allow for any interdependence between wealth 
(PROPFA), health (HLTHPROB) and progeny (SONSCHEA) equations.  However in the 
completely correlated model decision to coreside with children (CORESIDE) could be correlated 
with wealth, health and progeny effects (see specification 5 bel ow).  
  In order to facilitate identification of these four equations, we keep  at least one   20 
identifying variable in each equation. This is summarised in Table 3A (the Table also lists the 
definitions of variables). For example, currentl wealth of the elderly is clearly contingent upon 
household size (HHSIZE) though we cannot predict its any direct relevance of household size for 
current health. Thus household size  is the identifying variable in the wealth equation while 
predicted value of average per capita monthly consumer expenditure (APCE)
21 is the identifying 
variable in the health equation. This is because current health would depend on current 
consumption expenditure including expenditure on health/medication. In general, lower caste 
(scheduled caste/scheduled tribe) households tend to be less educated and tend to invest less in 
child’s education. Accordingly, the binary variable SCST indicating whether a household belongs 
to lower caste (scheduled caste/scheduled tribe category) is included as an identification variable 
in the progeny equation.    
     
3.3. Correlated Estimates 
The joint marginal likelihood function can be written as: 
[ ] h h h h h h h h h h h h
h h h h







C d d d d f L L L L
c F H S
) , , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
 
where  ) , , , ( h h h h S H W C f  is the  joint distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity 
components. Here  ) , , , ( h h h h S H W C f  is a four dimensional normal distribution characterised 
as follows: 
                                                  
21 Since average per capita monthly consumer expenditure depends on household structure and earnings, it 
too would suffer from simultaneity bias. In an attempt to reduce this bias, we use the value of average per 
capital consumer expenditure predicted by various household composition variables as well as the 
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The model is estimated using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) Method. 
Conditional on all the heterogeneity terms, the equations are independent and the conditional joint 
likelihood can be obtained by simply multiplying the individual log likelihoods.  
The main reason for joint estimation is  the simultaneity and the implicit self-
selection:  elderly persons who have  educated and e conomically active sons, elderly 
persons who  have accumulated wealth and those who have some health problems and 
elderly person who choose to coreside with their children are not necessarily a random 
subset of all elderly persons in the sample. In addition elderly persons who coreside with 
children might well have some (additional) and private information about their own 
wealth and health and thereby may choose to educate their sons with a view to coreside 
with them. All these essentially means that the correlation between the heterogeneity 
terms in the  wealth equation,  health equation,  presence of economically active sons 
equation and the coresidency equation could be non-zero: i.e., Cov(hi, hj)?0, i,j = C, W, 
H, S, i ? j.  However conditional on all the heterogeneity terms, the equations are 
independent and the conditional joint likelihood can be obtained by simply multiplying 
the individual log likelihoods.  
 
 
4.  DETERMINANTS OF CORESIDENCE 
Means and standard deviations of the included variables are summarised in Table 3.    22 
Estimation is carried out in stages. (a) First we estimate the uncorrelated probit estimates 
of coresidence with children, assuming current wealth, health of the elderly and presence of 
economically active sons with schooling  to be exogenously given.
22 These estimates are 
summarised in column (1) and (2) of Table 4A. While column 1 shows the estimates without any 
unobserved heterogeneity (specification 1), column (2) shows those  with  household-level 
unobserved  heterogeneity (specification 2 ). Estimates shown in columns (3)-(5) of Table 4A 
allows for the possibility that that coresidence with children may be correlated with (a) current 
wealth (specification 3: assumes health and progeny effects to be exogenous), (b) current wealth 
and health of the elderly person (specification 4: assumes progeny effects to be exogenous) and 
(c) current health, wealth and progeny (specification 5: allows for correlation with health, wealth 
and progeny). The latter is the most complete model in our analysis. Table 4B, 4C and 4D show 
the corresponding estimates (jointly determined with coresidence) of wealth, health and progeny 
equations respectively for these specifications. Finally Table 4E summarises the corresponding 
estimates of the unobserved heterogeneity terms involved  in these specifications (1)-(5) as shown 
in Tables 4A-4D.   
 
4.1. Coresidence with children 
It clearly follows from Table 4D that there is a significant unobserved heterogeneity in living 
arrangements in our sample. So we start by considering the uncorrelated estimates with 
heterogeneity as shown in column (2) of the Table and compare these estimates with those shown 
in columns (3), (4) and (5) of the Table. This suggests some evidence of simultaneity bias in these 
estimates. For example, when we allow  only  wealth to be correlated with coresidence with 
children, the variable (HLTHPROB) indicating current heath status is not statistically significant 
                                                  
22 We started with pooled regressions with a gender dummy. However, since the gender dummy was significant in all 
equations, we included all the gender interaction terms with included explanatory variables in each equation. The final 
specifications as shown in Table 4A-4C are obtained by excluding the insignificant terms and represents the most 
parsimonius specification.   23 
though it turns out to be significant when we allow health, wealth and progeny to be correlated 
with coresidence. We also find that as we allow for the correlation between coresidence on the 
one hand and health, wealth and progeny equations on the other, significance of wealth goes up 
significantly. This is also reflected in the corresponding correlation coefficients between the 
unobserved heterogeneity terms in these equations. For example, allowing only for correlations 
between wealth and coresidence, the correlation coefficient (rWC) is positive  and statistically 
insignificant. However as we allow all the equations to be correlated, this correlation coefficient 
turns out to be negative and statistically significant too.  
  We therefore proceed to interpret the final  results (specification  5)  where  the 
unobserved heterogeneity terms in the progeny, wealth and health equations are all treated to be 
correlated with that in the coresidency equation. The likelihood of coresidence is higher among 
elderly men  in general. Although widowed elderly persons are less likely to coreside, widowed 
elderly men are more likely to coreside. In other words, widowed elderly women are less likely to 
coreside with children. Likelihood of coresidence is, h owever,  higher among better off elderly 
persons, e.g., those with some accumulated wealth or those belonging to  households with 
generally higher average per capita expenditure. In other words, there is some confirmation that 
in our sample that wealth attracts kids though given the data limitations we could not test the 
hypothesis of manipulative parents. Secondly, effects o f health problems are adverse in that 
elderly members with some health problems are less likely to coreside with children. Given the 
nature of our data, we however cannot explore  whether  it is the result of some coercion or 
whether decided by the elderly persons themselves. Finally, elderly persons with economically 
active married/unmarried sons with schooling are more likely to coreside.  
  Given the  significance of  health and wealth estimates, mere presence of active 
sons with schooling and/or coresidence with children could not suggest that children provide the 
expected  old age insurance in rural India. In fact there are reasons to believe the contrary as our 
results suggest that elderly  persons  who  lack wealth, health or both or disadvantaged in other   24 
ways (e.g., widowed elderly women) are less likely to coreside with children.  
 
4.2. Wealth Effects  
Estimates of the elderly people’s wealth as measured in terms of ownership of property and/or 
financial assets are summarised in Table 4B for specifications (1) - (5).
23 Considering the final 
specification (5), it  follows that elderly men are more likely to be wealthy though 
widowed/separated men are less likely to do so. There is also a return to schooling so that elderly 
persons with schooling are more likely to be wealthy. Similarly, previously economically active 
elderly are more likely to be wealthy.
24 Finally, elderly persons from larger households are more 
likely to be wealthy, even after accounting for unobserved household-level heterogeneity. The 
latter could reflect the fact that own savings/wealth of the elderly is likely to be correlated with 
the unobserved wealth of the other members of the household. Thus in a larger household, it is 
more likely that more members will have some savings than in a smaller household which in turn 
would justify this finding.  
 
4.2. Health effects 
Estimates for health problems (HLTHPROB), if any, are shown in columns (1)-(5) respectively 
for specifications (1) – (5) in Table 4C. Note that there are no estimates for the health function in 
specification (3) when we allow only wealth to be correlated with coresidency decision and treat 
health to be exogenously given. In this section we interpret the correlated estimates for 
specification (5) (see column 5 of the Table). In general, incidence of health problems is likely to 
be higher among  widowed/separated  and previously economically active  elderly persons, 
especially among elderly men. Also elderly from better off households as indicated by higher 
                                                  
23 Please note that we had also experimented with a broader definition of wealth that in addition includes 
the provision of regular income after retirement, if any, and obtained very similar results as presented here.  
24 Note that there seems to be a selection bias with respect to this variable in specification (3) and (4) where 
ONCEACT has a negative coefficient.   25 
APCE is more likely to have some health problems. However, widowed/separated elderly men 
are less likely to report of having any health problem.   
 
4.3. Progeny effects 
Finally, we consider the uncorrelated and correlated estimates of having economically active sons 
with schooling in our sample. These estimates are shown in columns (1), (2) and (5) of Table 4D. 
Note that in this case we do not have any estimates corresponding to specification (3) and (4) 
where we do not allow for non-zero correlation with the progeny equation. 
  As before we proceed to interpret the estimates of the complete model that allow 
for the unobserved heterogeneity terms in wealth, health and progeny equations to be correlated 
with that in the coresidency equation. Most of these results are self-explanatory. For e xample, 
parental education, especially mother’s education, plays an important role on sons schooling. In 
particular, elderly persons, especially elderly women, with primary schooling or higher are more 
likely to have educated economically active sons. Parental past employment is important too in 
that previously economically active elderly are more likely
25 while elderly persons from  poorer 
lower caste households (scheduled caste/scheduled tribe)
26 are less likely to have economically 
active sons with schooling. The latter seems to signify the role of parental wealth on children 
schooling which is well documented in the literature.   
  To summarise, these r esults  raise concern  particularly  for two groups of 
disadvantaged elderly, namely, those  lacking wealth,  health  or both  and also those 
widowed/separated women (who are  generally considered a sset poor, e.g., see Drèze and 
Srinivasan, 1997) in that both these groups of elderly  are less likely to coreside.  Some could 
argue that even non-coresident elderly parents could obtain financial and other support from their 
children. But the available information from our data-set is not very encouraging in this respect: 
                                                  
25 Here too a simultaneity bias is observed if we compare estimate of ONCEACT in columns (2) and (5).    26 
only 20% of non-coresident elderly parents with children obtain some financial assistance from 
their children. Similarly, only about a third of these elderly have children living in the same 
village so that they could get immediate medical/personal help if needed. Thus, in the absence of 
any extra- familial welfare institutions, the state needs to come forward to protect the interests of 
the vulnerable elderly members who lack health, wealth or both or disadvantaged in other ways.   
 
  
 5. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
Little is known about the living conditions of a growing number of elderly in India most of whom 
tend  to coreside with their children, especially sons.  The lack of research in this area partly 
reflects the general belief that these elderly are well looked after by their children. Using the 
recent NSS data we examine the living arrangements of the elderly in rural India.  
  A comparison of average per capita consumer expenditure between elderly persons 
in different living arrangements suggests that adjusted APCE are higher in households where 
elderly persons coreside with children than living otherwise. In the absence of any better indicator 
of the well-being of the elderly, elderly coresiding with children is better off than living otherwise 
in a society where there is no tradition of extra-familial welfare institutions.  
  Next we examine the factors determining the elderly person’s  coresidence with 
children. In our analysis household structure affects elderly person’s well-being as measured in 
terms of coresidence with children where both household structure and living arrangements are 
both choice variables. This necessitates us to resolve the complex simultaneity problem in our 
analysis. We adopt a unique approach to estimate the probability of coresidence, after allowing 
for its possible correlation with elderly person’s current wealth, health and presence o f 
economically active sons with schooling while we assume gender, marital status, education and 
                                                                                                                                                    
26 The correlation between caste and distribution of wealth in rural India is well documented. In general, 
lower caste households in rural India tend to have less land and non-land assets (Pal, 1994).   27 
past employment of the elderly person to be given in a static framework.  These estimates tend to 
reveal a more complex picture than it emerges from a comparison of APCE across different living 
arrangements. Although  presence of economically active sons with schooling may promote 
coresidence with children, presence of sons could not by itself be regarded as old age insurance 
for all groups of elderly in our sample. Current health and wealth of the elderly too are important 
in the analysis of living arrangements where more vulnerable elderly, especially those without 
health, wealth or both are less likely to coreside with children.  
  While coresidency with children is a social convention  in India till today and 
APCE is higher for elderly coresiding with children, analysis of coresidency with children tends 
to suggest that the latter cannot by itself be regarded as sufficient means of old age insurance. In 
particular, our results raise concerns for the elderly who lack wealth, health or both or 
disadvantaged in other ways, e.g., widowed/separated elderly women. Public policy on ageing in 
developing countries has tended to emphasise the welfare requirements of older populations, 
ignoring the wider dimensions of livelihoods in old age. The prevailing emphasis on pension 
schemes for formal sector workers and on individual contributions to pension funds, as outlined 
by the World Bank in 1994, excludes the majority of older people in poor countries who live and 
work outside the formal sector and lack the capacity to save. Basic non-contributory pension 
schemes, designed as an integral part of India government’s poverty reduction programmes, are 
most likely to target the increasing numbers of poorer elderly  people though the pronounced 
inter-state disparity in this respect needs to be addressed.   28 
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Table 1A. Selected Characteristics of Elderly Living Arrangements  
(All members with and without children) 
 
  Married  Widowed/separated 
  Male  Female  Male  Female 








Alone  Child 
only 




69  75  51  49  64  73  48  51 
Ownership of 
property 




18  35  44  24  19  48  39  71 
Financially 
dependent  




40  33.5  31.6  29  42  44  37  42 
Long-term 
illness 
54  51  45  47  59  57  52  56 
Physical 
immobility 




86  84   88  92  92  78  93  85 
Participates in 
social matters 
83  86  77  75  81  84  71  74 
Participates in 
religious matters 
84  89  85  84  83  86  77  83 
No of obs.  1098  5929  642  2758  153  1094  431  740 
 
Note: All figures are in percentages and adjusted for sample weights.    31 
Table 1B. Welfare Characteristics of Various Living Arrangements 
 
 
  Living arrangements 
  Alone or with other 
relations/non-
relations 







60  61  67 
Owns financial 
properties (%) 
72  73  78 
 
Owns financial 









Provision of regular 

























Chronic illness (%)  54.4  51  51 
 
Any of these health 
problems (%) 
67  65  62 
 
Able to participate 









Able to participate 









Able to participate 

















Note: All figures are adjusted by sample weights.   32 
Table 2:  Living Arrangements and Living Standards  
 
  Living arrangements 
Average per capita 
monthly 
consumption exp. 
(APCE) in Rs. 
Alone or with other 
relations/non-
relations 






Unadjusted APCE   
 
370.2  372.6 (195.4)  371.9 (205.3) 
Equivalence scale 
adjusted APCE 
     
1, 1, 0.6  564.2 (734.1)  516.3 (426.8)  620.1 (593.2) 
1, 0.8, 0.6  610.0 (781.4)  565.5 (481.9)  672.2 (643.6) 
1, 0.7, 0.5  662.9 (820.6)  620.1 (527.9)  737.9 (701.9) 
Size economies of 
scale adjusted 
APCE 
     
0.8  497.4 (318.3)  498.8 (243.8)  521.6 (273.1) 
0.6  681.8 (422.1)  679.5 (335.0)  741.8 (392.1) 
0.4  951.7 (600.0)  941.1 (499.9)  1068.3 (599.4) 
0.2  1350.2 (900.3)  1323.5( (786.1)  1556.5 (956.6) 
 
Note: Standard deviations are shown in the parentheses.  33 
Table 2A. Equivalence scales adjusted APCE : All households 
 
  Households with old persons  Households without old persons 
States  (1,1,0.6)  (1.0.8,0.6)  (1,0.7, 0.5)  (1,1,0.6)  (1.0.8,0.6)  1,0.7, 0.5) 
AP  471.9  516.7  567.6  409.0  448.9  492.6 
Assam  531.5  572.1  626.5  401.1  431.5  471.7 
Bihar  496.8  535.8  590.2  388.4  421.9  465.1 
Gujarat  601.2  654.4  718.4  520.4  565.6  618.8 
Haryana  730.8  783.8  857.7  601.7  646.8  710.7 
J&K  695.1  743.3  814.3  565.4  606.1  663.2 
Karanataka  582.8  639.4  702.2  422.7  461.5  507.3 
Kerala  684.2  749.6  819.1  590.2  650.3  714.7 
MP  554.4  598.8  656.0  407.8  441.0  483.3 
Maharashtra  544.6  598.9  660.1  450.3  492.5  540.8 
Orissa  492.7  535.8  588.8  361.1  392.4  428.9 
Punjab  921.6  997.3  1091.6  649.3  700.4  765.3 
Rajasthan  645.9  695.7  765.1  529.7  571.3  627.1 
Tamilnadu  478.0  527.9  578.3  440.2  486.3  532.4 
UP  586.4  631.7  691.6  451.0  486.2  532.4 
WB  566.5  613.2  675.3  390.4  423.6  465.0 
All India  588.6  638.3  700.0  464.2  503.2  551.2 
 
Source: Pal and Palacios (2004).    34 
TABLE 2B. Size economies of scale adjusted APCE, All households 
 
  Households with elderly 
members 
Households without elderly 
members 
State  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.2  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.2 
AP  429.3  578.1  789.8  1094  402.8  530.8  705.6  945.7 
Assam  448.2  647.0  941.5  1381  420.8  571.1  780.5  1073 
Bihar  403.1  584.1  858.0  1276  374.9  515.6  716.9  1007 
Gujarat  564.6  785.6  1109  1587  526.9  718.5  988.8  1372 
Haryana  658.4  948.3  1379  2023  658.9  911.9  1271  1783 
J&K  581.3  848.1  1250  1858  603.2  835.6  1165  1636 
Ktaka  464.7  661.6  955.2  1397  441.5  595.5  811.5  1117 
Kerala  622.1  858.6  1197  1686  654.5  859.0  1137  1516 
MP  442.3  632.5  918.4  1353  410.8  559.4  769.3  1068 
Maharra  469.5  649.8  913.4  1302  455.3  610.9  826.9  1128 
Orissa  387.5  546.5  781.5  1132  356.9  473.8  636.2  863.3 
Punjab  782.7  1128  1642  2411  696.4  954.6  1319  1835 
Rajasthan  532.8  761.4  1103  1616  527.1  720.4  994.5  1386 
Tamilnadu  441.0  578.1  768.9  1036  433.6  564.1  740.0  978.4 
UP  465.3  667.9  974.8  1445  443.5  611.2  851.5  1198 
WB  467.4  661.6  947.9  1374  404.2  545.9  743.4  1020 
All India                 
 
Source: Pal and Palacios (2004).  
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Table 3A. Specification of a complete coherent model 
 
  Coresidency  Wealth  Health  Progeny 
 
  CORESIDE  PROPFA  HLTHPROB  SONSCHEA 
         
Intercept  v  v  v  v 
         
MALE  v  v  v  v 
         
WIDSEP  v  v  v  v 
         
MWID  v  v  v  v 
         
SCH  ×  v  v  v 
         
MSCH  v  v  ×  v 
         
ONCEACT  v  v  v  v 
         
SCST  ×  ×  ×  v 
         
HHSIZE  ×  v  ×  v 
         
APCE  v  ×  v  v 
         
PROPFA  v  ×  ×  v 
         
HLTHPROB  v  ×  ×  v 
         
SONSCHEA  v  ×  ×  v 
         
EAST  v  v  v  v 
         
NORTH1  v  v  v  v 
         
NORTH2  v  v  v  v 
         
SOUTH  v  v  v  v 
 
Note:  Definitions of variables: MALE: 1 if an elderly male person. WIDSEP: 1 if the elderly 
perosn is widowed/separated. MWID: MALE*WIDSEP. SCH: 1 if the elderly person has primary 
or higher level of schooling. MSCH: MALE*SCH. ONCEACT: 1 if the elderly person has 
previously participated in some economic activity. SCST: 1 if the elderly person belongs to a 
scheduled caste or scheduled tribe household. HHSIZE: Natural logarithm of household size. 
APCE: predicted value of average per capita monthly consumer expenditure. PROPFA: 1 if the 
elderly person owns property and/or financial assets. HLTHPROB: 1 if the elderly person suffers 
from some health problem (see text). SONSCHEA: 1 if the elderly person has any economically 
active son with schooling (coresident/non-coresident). EAST, NORTH1, NORTH2, SOUTH: 
regional dummies for eastern, northern and southern states in India.  NORTH1:  Rajasthan, UP 
and MP. NORTH2: Punjab and Haryana; EAST: Bihar, Orissa, WB; SOUTH: AP, Kerala, 
Karnataka and Tamil Nadu.   36 
Table 3B. Means and Standard Deviations of Variables 
 
Variable  OBS  Mean  Std Dev 
       
MALE  13810  0.645402  0.478409 
 
WIDSEP  13810  0.199204  0.399416 
 
MWID  13810  0.104996  0.30656 
 
SCH  13810  0.26336  0.440472 
 
MSCH  13810  0.221579  0.415324 
 
ONCEACT  13810  0.27357  0.445807 
 
Log(HHSIZE)  13810  1.636465  0.694536 
 
APCE/1000  13810  0.372062  0.093868 
 
SCST  13810  0.280956  0.449482 
 
PROPFA    13810  0.773642  0.418488 
 
HLTHPROB  13810  0.626358  0.483788 
 
SONSCHEA  13810  0.548421  0.467099 
 
EAST  13810  0.211658  0.408499 
 
NORTH1  13810  0.269515  0.443724 
 
NORTH2  13810  0.073642  0.261197 
 
SOUTH  13810  0.211079  0.408089 
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Table 4A. Determinants of coresidency 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 






With Heterogeneity + non-zero correlation 
 





           
Intercept  0.9708 ***  1.5420 ***  1.5827 ***  1.6635 ***  -3.7372 *** 
  0.1088  0.3965  0.4097  0.4151  0.81 
MALE  -0.1462 **  -0.3633 **  -0.3380 **  -0.3170 *  -0.9540 *** 
  0.0634  0.1588  0.1722  0.1763  0.1733 
WIDSEP  -0.1896 ***  -0.2282 
*** 
-0.2279 ***  -0.2181 ***  -0.1740 *** 
  0.0611  0.2159  0.2172  0.2202  0.249 
MWID  0.2144 **  1.0074 ***  0.9948 ***  0.9877 ***  1.2006 *** 
  0.0909  0.2763  0.2768  0.2794  0.2847 
MSCH  0.3257 ***  0.3856 *  0.3948 *  0.3777 *  0.6036 *** 
  0.0465  0.2015  0.2029  0.2051  0.1954 
ONCEACT  0.0443  0.2095  0.2065  0.2279  0.1952 
  0.0369  0.1418  0.1423  0.1542  0.1624 
APCE  -2.9266 ***  -5.1938 
*** 
-5.1775 ***  -5.1845 ***  -7.5952 *** 
  0.2118  0.8428  0.8389  -=0.8437  1.0152 
PROPFA  0.2429 ***  0.5568 ***  0.4756 *  0.4788 *  0.8615 *** 
  0.0375  0.1314  0.2571  0.2592  0.2748 
HLTHPROB  -0.0198  0.1485  0.1472  -0.0241  -0.8787 *** 
  0.032  0.1306  0.1308  0.2582  0.2317 
SONSCHEA  0.0850 ***  0.3299 ***  0.3260 ***  0.4422 ***  0.6168 *** 
  0.00344  0.0428  0.04  0.0372  .0236 
EAST  -0.3469 ***  -0.6277 
*** 
-0.6168 ***  -0.6303 ***  -1.0761 *** 
  0.0476  0.2086  0.208  0.2077  0.2423 
NORTH1  -0.2846 ***  -0.6110 
*** 
-0.5975 ***  -0.6090 ***  -0.5418 *** 
  0.0413  0.1792  0.1797  0.1814  0.203 
NORTH2  0.2755 ***  0.6557 **  0.6825 **  0.6459 **  1.2099 *** 
  0.0607  0.3024  0.3035  0.3088  0.395 
SOUTH  -0.0900 **  0.3659 *  0.3702 *  0.3711 *  -1.5731 *** 
  0.043  0.1928  0.1929  0.1948  0.2238 
           
ln-L  -26524.71  -23836.59     
- 
-9342.54  -17877.72  -19677.18 
           
 
 
NOTE:  Asymptotic standard errors are shown below the estimates; 
       Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  '***'=1%.   38 
Table 4B . Determinants of current wealth 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 





With Heterogeneity + non-zero correlation 
 
      Wealth   health + wealth  Health+wealth+
progeny 
           
Intercept  0.2212 ***  0.9272 ***  0.9272 ***  0.9439 ***  0.9361 *** 
  0.0438  0.2481  0.2468  0.2536  0.2557 
MALE  1.0256 ***  2.3212 ***  2.3200 ***  2.3150 ***  2.2711 *** 
  0.0383  0.0834  0.0831  0.0833  0.082 
WIDSEP  0.4745 ***  1.2110 ***  1.2094 ***  1.1998 ***  1.1813 *** 
  0.0449  0.1082  0.108  0.1081  0.107 




-1.4894 ***  -1.4839 ***  -1.4722 *** 
  0.0661  0.135  0.1345  0.1348  0.1343 
SCH  0.1032 *  0.3389 **  0.3376 **  0.3386 **  0.3213 ** 
  0.0573  0.1388  0.1383  0.1379  0.1365 
MSCH  0.1379 *  0.1841  0.1856  0.1832  0.2055 
  0.0709  0.1508  0.1504  0.1502  0.1489 




-0.9615 ***  -0.9576 ***  0.9558 *** 
  0.027  0.0617  0.0615  0.0616  0.0617 
HHSIZE  0.0604 ***  0.1225 ***  0.1228 ***  0.1206 ***  0.1446 *** 
  0.018  0.0443  0.0442  0.0442  0.0445 
EAST  -0.0133  -0.0612  -0.0623  -0.0585  -0.0645 
  0.0356  0.0933  0.0928  0.0931  0.0924 
NORTH1  -0.0021  0.0148  0.0142  0.022  0.0218 
  0.0328  0.087  0.0869  0.087  0.0864 
NORTH2  -0.1299 
*** 
0.0431  0.0485  0.0369  0.0174 
  0.05  0.1259  0.1256  0.1256  0.1252 




-0.7920 ***  -0.7949 ***  -0.7858 *** 
  0.034  0.0858  0.0856  0.0856  0.0851 
           
ln-L  -26524.7  -23836.5  -9342.54  -17877.72  -19677.18 
 
NOTE:  Asymptotic standard errors are shown below the estimates; 
       Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  '***'=1%.   39 
Table 4C.  Determinants of current health problems 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 







With Heterogeneity + non-zero correlation 
 




Intercept  -0.2851 ***  -0.4451 ***    -0.4561 ***  -0.4587 *** 
  0.063  0.1131    0.1132  0.1118 
MALE  0.0799 ***  0.1933 ***    0.1943 ***  0.1826 *** 
  0.0308  0.0358    0.0358  0.0357 
WIDSEP  0.2211 ***  0.4122 ***    0.4119 ***  0.3964 *** 
  0.0434  0.0664    0.0665  0.0659 
MWID  -0.1085 *  -0.2315 ***    -0.2334 ***  -0.2229 *** 
  0.0601  0.087    0.087  0.0865 
SCH  -0.0007  0.0111    0.0076  0.016 
  0.0282  0.0438    0.0437  0.0433 
ONCEACT  0.5775 ***  0.8227 ***    0.8239 ***  0.8140 *** 
  0.0262  0.0418    0.0418  0.0415 
APCE  0.9631 ***  1.3949 ***    1.4245 ***  1.4346 *** 
  0.1372  0.2539    0.254  0.2509 
EAST  0.1700 ***  0.2494 ***    0.2574 ***  0.2562 *** 
  0.035  0.0631    0.0633  0.0625 
NORTH1  0.0064  -0.0064    -0.0027  0.0011 
  0.0301  0.0558    0.0558  0.055 
NORTH2  -0.1776 ***  -0.2598 ***    -0.2697 ***  -0.2664 *** 
  0.0432  0.0811    0.0811  0.0801 
SOUTH  -0.0075  -0.0246    -0.0265  -0.0162 
  0.0322  0.0569    0.0569  0.0562 
ln-L  -26524.7  -23836.5  -9342.54  -17877.72  -19677.18 
     
 
NOTE:  Asymptotic standard errors are shown below the estimates; 
       Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  '***'=1%.   40 
Table 4D.  Progeny effects 
 















     
Health + Wealth  
+ Progeny 
       
       
MALE  0.0809  0.1206  -1.8333 
  0.0533  0.1783  4.4204 
WIDSEP  -0.5874 ***  -3.7703 ***  -4.3504 
  0.0497  0.2461  4.4455 
MWID  0.6029 ***  4.0733 ***  3.3669 
  0.073  0.2964  4.4509 
SCH  0.8602 ***  2.2219 ***  2.1074 *** 
  0.0647  0.2364  0.4776 
MSCH  -0.3300 ***  -1.1903 ***  -1.1004 ** 
  0.0753  0.2527  0.4863 
ONCEACT  0.0014  -0.0072  0.6157 *** 
  0.0267  0.0965  0.2288 
APCE  -8.7696 ***  -35.8275 ***  -  10.4431 *** 
  0.1772  1.5913  2.1568 
SCST  -0.5748 ***  -0.5572 ***  -0.6237 *** 
  0.0246  0.1267  0.1268 
EAST  -0.9272 ***  -3.6700 ***  -0.9472 ** 
  0.0359  0.2039  0.3705 
NORTH1  -0.5730 ***  -1.6839 ***  -0.2016 
  0.0306  0.1356  0.3419 
NORTH2  0.8789 ***  3.6075 ***  2.9725 *** 
  0.0426  0.2232  0.9758 
SOUTH  -0.5786 ***  -1.9378 ***  -1.1998 *** 
  0.0312  0.1282  0.27 
       
ln-L  -26524.7  -23836.5  -19677.18 
 
NOTE:  Asymptotic standard errors are shown below the estimates; 
       Significance: '*'=10%;  '**'=5%;  '***'=1%.   41 
Table 4E. Structure of unobserved heterogeneity terms      
 
  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  With 
Heterogen
eity + zero 
correlation 
 
With Heterogeneity + non-zero correlation 
 
    Wealth   health & 
wealth  
Health,wealth 
& progeny  
hW   2.7778 ***  2.7753 ***  2.7844 ***  2.7597 *** 
  0.317  0.3152  0.3249  0.3275 
hS   4.5352 ***      6.6788 * 
  0.1867      3.4348 
hH  1.1549 ***    1.1575 ***  1.1367 *** 
  0.0404    0.0406  0.0409 
hC  3.5912 ***  3.5942 ***  3.6408 ***  10.5834 *** 
  0.1848  0.187  0.2162  1.0112 
r(W,S)        0.0783 
        1.0013 
r(W,H)      -0.0701 ***  -0.0634 *** 
      0.0234  0.0235 
r(W,C)    0.0156  0.0163 ***  -0.0242* 
    0.045  0.0045  0.0053 
r(S,H)        0.0566 
        0.0071 
r(S,C)        -0.8143 *** 
        0.0402 
r(H,C)      0.0453 *  -0.0666 *** 
      0.0243  0.0182 
 
 
 
 